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The appropriation and use of others’ speech is ubiquitous.
People engage in the practice daily when the statements of others
appear in segments of conversation. Appropriation and use likewise
occur every day when newspapers publish – and purchase – a story
from the Associated Press newswire. Television viewers who watch a
television show through the use of cable technology benefit from this
sort of secondary use; the same is true for a corporation’s
advertisement that is produced by and purchased from an advertising
agency.
Despite the prevalence of these speech acts – which we call
“speech selection judgments”2 – traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence is often at a loss when it confronts them. Speech
selection judgments often rise to the level of protected First
Amendment speech, but it is not always clear why.3 The opposite is
also true.4 What is it about these “secondary” speech acts that might
qualify them for First Amendment protection? Is the decision to
communicate the speech of another person itself speech for purposes
of the First Amendment? What criteria should qualify these speech
acts as privileged speech under the First Amendment?
Little in the way of First Amendment theory or doctrine is
available to clarify the constitutional boundaries surrounding speech
selection judgments. The law of libel recognizes the existence of
speech selection judgments and offers some assistance. It calls
publication of a statement previously published by another

2. Speech selection judgments involve the appropriation or selection of speech
originally created elsewhere (by another) and the secondary deployment of that material
in another context by a person or entity different than the original creator. The practice is
essentially citational – not in the narrow sense of encasing words within quotation marks –
but in the broader sense that one repeats the words, speech, message, or meaning of
another and yet claims governance and, often, ownership over the repetitive use.
3. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the act
of discharging a homosexual Boy Scout leader is an act of speaking by Boy Scouts); FEC
v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that a contribution to an
ideological organization is the speech of the contributor); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the publication of an advertisement is the speech act of
the newspaper).
4. A host of speech selection judgments are excepted from First Amendment
protection. For instance, the individual donor’s decision to support certain parties or
candidates or charitable causes and not others is not generally considered a protected act
of expression. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The copyright violator’s
transformative republication of a protected work is not always, or even usually, protected
by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, 194 F.3d 1211
(1999); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). Neither does the First
Amendment protect the libeler’s decision to publish a knowing falsehood by artful editing
of another’s statement. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
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“republication,” and affords the republisher some, albeit limited,
protection for the act.5 But this only covers a narrow array of
speakers and speech since republication only applies to already
6
published speech. Republished speech that adds no new meaning
whatever sometimes receives substantial First Amendment
protection, but the republisher is often disqualified as a First
Amendment speaker.7 The First Amendment tends to provide more
secure protection for republications that add meaning to the
originally published message, and thus reflect the independent
communicative will of the republisher, but this result is largely
unexplained in the judicial decisions.8 Is there something intrinsic in
the addition of new meaning or independent will that confers upon
speech selections the status of “speech” or “speaker”?
Just as the status of speech selection is often mysterious, so also
is the identity of a, or the, speaker. Parties who erect First
Amendment claims for citational, secondary speech acts typically do
so upon fact patterns that involve more than one speaker and more
than one artifact of speech. The fact patterns often pit various
speakers and artifacts of speech against one another. As such,
th

5. Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 799-802 (5 ed. 1984); Robert D. Sack, Libel,
Slander and Related Problems (2d ed. 1994).
6. In other words, the doctrine of republication under libel law would not cover the
cable operator’s selection of material for transmission to its viewers, nor would it cover a
corporation’s selection and use of an advertising agency’s advertisement.
7. See, e.g., Buckley, supra n. 4 (discussing political campaign contributions).
However, it is not clear whether the freedom in such cases is the republisher’s or the
original author’s, or perhaps both. Is the campaign contribution, arguably an instance of
speech selection by the contributor, the speech of the candidate (or campaign committee)
alone, or is the contribution perhaps too passive an act to qualify for First Amendment
protection? Consider also the Hurley case, supra n. 1, at 572-75 (discussing a parade
organizer’s right to exclude parade participants’ messages). Is the pro-gay message of a
group marching in a parade the message of the parade organizer, or the group, or both?
See also Denver Area Telecomm. Consort., Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (discussing the
competing speech and speaker claims among a cable operator, a channel operator
(municipal commission), and program producers and originators).
8. Even here there may be exceptions. The copyright violator’s transformative
republication of a protected work is not always, or even usually, protected by the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, supra n. 4. The libeler’s decision to
publish a knowing falsehood by artful editing of another’s statement is not protected
speech. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra n. 3; Masson, supra. The market newsletter’s decision to
select, as its own news, a story written and paid for by a company about itself, is not
protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d
365 (D.C.Cir. 1988). The individual donor’s decision to support certain parties or
candidates or charitable causes and not others is not generally considered a protected act
of expression. See, e.g., Buckley, supra n. 4. Is this because these selection judgments,
while speech for First Amendment purposes, have insufficient value, or lack specific
communicative intention, or are too harmful, to warrant full protection?
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precedent from speech selection cases often tramples upon one or
more parties who are literally speaking. This outcome threatens to
unravel many of the cherished protections traditionally extended to
the speaking individual, and threatens to use arbitrary audience
interpretations of messages as the rubric for stabilizing and
determining the meaning inherent in messages. In short, speech
selection judgments must be examined more carefully and
systematically. Otherwise, precedent from speech selection cases
threatens to unravel the First Amendment’s core.
We argue that a largely unappreciated and unevaluated complex
of factors are at work in the law’s treatment of speech selection
judgments as First Amendment speech. It is to the additional criteria
and their basis in theory and practice that this article is directed. Our
purpose is to explore the phenomenon of speech selection and the
attributes of speaking and communication that may account for its
status as speech under the First Amendment. Our goals are
exploratory and evocative, not prescriptive. We focus on a single
case, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
9
Boston, in an effort to expose the complicated elements lying
beneath the surface of the Court’s opinion. We turn, first, to the
multiple and conflicting forms of speech and speakers that exist in
Hurley. We then consider four different theories of speech and/or
communication, measuring the Court’s First Amendment reasoning
against them. Our goal is to reveal the deep ambiguities about the
nature of speech selection judgments and to critique the free speech
principles implicit in the Court’s decision.

I. The Multiple Speakers and Forms of Speech in Hurley
The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council is a private
association of representatives of veterans groups authorized since
1947 by the City of Boston to organize and conduct the annual St.
Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade.10 In 1993 the Council denied
the application of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group (GLIB) to participate in the parade.11 GLIB wished to “march

9. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
10. The Council itself applies for and receives a permit from the city every year to
organize and conduct the parade. Through 1992, however, the city allowed the Council to
use the city’s official seal and directly funded the parade. Id. at 560-61.
11. Two things should be noted about this denial. First, the Council denied GLIB’s
permit to participate in the parade the previous year, but was ultimately forced to allow
GLIB’s participation due to a court order. Id. at 561. Second, GLIB was not the only
candidate denied in 1993. The Council also denied the Ku Klux Klan and ROAR (an anti-
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in the parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to demonstrate that
there are such men and women among those so descended, and to
express solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in New
York’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade.”12 GLIB challenged the Council’s
refusal to permit it to march. It based its claim on the Massachusetts
public accommodation law, which prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation “in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement.”13 The state trial court and appellate court concluded
that the Council’s decision to exclude GLIB violated the public
accommodations law and ruled that the Council must admit GLIB to
the parade on the same terms as any other applicant.14 The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, holding that the exclusion of GLIB by
the Council constituted an exercise of the Council’s First Amendment
right of free speech.15 The Council, the Court held, was a speaker in
its own right16 entitled “to shape its expression by speaking on one
subject while remaining silent on another,”17 free from state
interference.
The Council’s decision was an instance of speech selection, the
choice of others’ speech by a party itself claiming that it did not want
to select the chosen expression of others. The Council, in the Court’s
view, was an organizer, indeed an assembler and composer, of a
collective mode of expression in the form of a thematic parade.18
What was it about the particular form or type of selection judgment
made by the Council that qualified it as the Council’s speech? What
precisely was the “speech” protected by the First Amendment? The
speakers and speech in Hurley take a number of potential forms. We
explore four possibilities.
A. The Participants as Speakers

The speaker(s) in Hurley could be the participants in the parade
– not the audience but the marchers, individually conveying messages
or, instead, conveying an overarching message through the meaning
of their collective participation. Ostensibly, the individual paraders
bussing group). Id. at 562.
12. Id. at 561.
13. Mass. Gen. Laws § 272:98 (1992).
14. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561-66.
15. Id. at 559.
16. Id. at 574.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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actually spoke, sang, chanted, carried signs, danced, or engaged in
that which qualifies normally as obviously expressive behavior.
However, the Court refused to credit the participants as speakers,
effectively disenfranchising them. The Court may have done so on
the ground that the participants were not, definitionally, qualified
speakers under the First amendment, or that while they, too, were
speakers, the Council’s speech claim subordinated or preempted their
speech claims, at least in relation to the meaning conveyed by their
collective participation.
B.

The Parade Organizer as Speaker

If the Council receives credit as the speaker, it can arguably
claim responsibility for two separate kinds of speech, each involving a
distinct status as speaker. The first kind of speech is the message
implicit in and conveyed through the Council’s selection judgments,
i.e., the exclusion of GLIB, the Ku Klux Klan, and the anti-bussing
groups. The parade organizer, the Council, functions as a speaker
when acting in its capacity as a composer or conductor – an assembler
– of speech. The second kind of speech is the message that resides in
the parade itself. In that scenario, the Council speaks through the
parade, which makes some kind of collective point. We turn to the
first alternative in this section, and discuss the second alternative
below.19
In litigation, the Council claimed the first speaker status. It
argued that, by selecting out GLIB, the parade expressed “traditional
religious and social values”;20 GLIB was “excluded because of its
[inconsistent] values and its message, i.e., its members’ sexual
orientation.”21 The Court went to great lengths to show that speech
(a message) did inhere in the Council’s organization of the parade
itself. “Every participating unit,” the Court said, “affects the message
conveyed by the . . . organizers.”22 Thus, forcing GLIB’s message
(express or constructed by bystanders) to be included “essentially
requir[ed] [the Council members] to alter the expressive content of
23
their parade.” The Council “clearly decided to exclude a message it
did not like from the communication it chose to make and that is
enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part I.D.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 562 (quoting the App. to Pet. for Cert. B3-B4, n.5).
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 572-73.
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by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.”24
The Court’s language reflects two alternative views of the
Council as speaker. The first is that the Council was expressing its
own predetermined message. GLIB would have altered it by
marching in the parade.25 The second view is that the Council had no
preexisting message. Instead, GLIB’s marching would have created
meaning out of the Council’s previously nonexpressive act of
assembling the parade.26 The Council was therefore entitled under
the First Amendment to eliminate GLIB from the parade in order to
eliminate GLIB’s message, because that message would have been
attributed to the Council.
These are two very different views of the Council’s actions and
its speech in Hurley.
Surprisingly, the Court was studiously
ambiguous about which of the two alternatives is applicable. For the
Court, the case “boils down to the choice of a speaker not to
propound a particular point of view.”27 “[A] private speaker,” the
Court said, “does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices.”28 Nor must the speaker (assembler)
“edit their themes (participants’) to isolate an exact message as the
exclusive subject matter of the speech.”29 According to the Court, the
First Amendment does not
Require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item
featured in the communication. . . . For example, the presentation
of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons is a
staple of most newspapers’ opinion pages, which, of course, fall
30
squarely within the core of First Amendment security.

Yet the Court fails to explain why this is and should be so.
Neither does it announce any limits – growing out of, for example,
speaker intention or purpose - on when speech selection amounts to
speech of the selector. For example, editing, which the court
specifically mentions, is a form of transformation through adoption of
others’ speech as the selector’s own. In comparison, a city manager
clearly can effect speech through the regulatory assignment of space
24. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
25. We addressed this view above.
organizer as speaker).
26. See infra section 1.D.
27. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
28. Id. at 569.
29. Id. at 570.
30. Id.

See infra Part I.B. (discussing the parade
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and time in a city park, or even a parade, but the manager would not
be considered a speaker or First Amendment claimant.31 How are we
to know the difference? The Court says virtually nothing about the
Council’s selection or other transformative actions in Hurley, except
to say that there need be no adoption, or even sponsorship or
endorsement, of the views of specific marchers selected or excluded
from the parade in order for the Council’s action to be that of a First
Amendment speaker.32 Yet in treating the Council as a speaker “in
its own right” whose interests prevail over all other speech interests,
the opinion necessarily implies that something expressively fullbodied results from—indeed is created by—the Council’s selection
decisions.
C.

The Parade Itself as Speaker and/or Speech

This conception of speech involves a message, either specific or
thematic, conveyed by the parade event, with the parade serving, in a
sense, as both speaker and speech. It is distinct from an intentional or
personal message, irrespective of whether the message’s ultimate
meaning derives from the marchers acting collectively or by the
Council. This form of speech is also distinct from a specific text
containing a clearly identifiable meaning (e.g., a political speech).
In assessing the expressive significance of a parade, the Court
distinguished a parade from a “march from here to there.”33 The
Court conceded that “[s]ome people might call such a procession a
parade, but it would not be much of one.”34 As an initial matter, then,
the Court argued that the words “march” or “processional” were not
precise synonyms for a parade. “Real” parades, the Court said, “are
public dramas of social relations”35 in which “performers define who
can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for
communication and consideration.”36 In contrast with a mere march,
a parade means “marchers who are making some sort of collective
point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.”37

31. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
32. 515 U.S. at 569-70.
33. Id. at 568.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting S. Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century
Philadelphia 6 (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press 1986)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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The Court emphasized “the inherent expressiveness of marching
to make a point [which] explains . . . cases involving protest
marches.”38 Is the Court, by this rather indirect reference, saying that
“making a point” is not a function of intention, specific or general, in
relation to a message, but is rather a function of the inherent
expressiveness of the medium of marching to those who witness it,
who by their perception and interpretation give it “a point?”39 If so,
on what basis can the Council be viewed as a speaker in its own right?
The meaning and role of intention or purpose is ambiguous in the
Court’s statement. Marching to make a point implies intention, on
the part of the marchers and also, it seems, on the part of the
organizers. But the Court never requires the Council to express a
specific point or coherent message, only “some sort of . . . point”40
with arguably symbolic significance. “Symbolism,” the Court says, “is
a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,”41 and “a
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection.”42
The parade itself, then, is the speaker, but a peculiar one: it is a
vessel to be filled with expressive meaning supplied extrinsically to
the event by the audiences who give it meaning(s). Perhaps the most
confusing thing about this conclusion is the way in which it seemingly
contradicts the Court’s implicit conclusion – that both the message
conveyed by the parade itself and the GLIB marching contingent
qualify as speech.43

38. Id. at 568.
39. See Boy Scouts of America, supra n. 3 (employing a similar logic); see also, R.
Bezanson, Artifactual Speech, 3 U. Penn. J. of Const. Law 819 (2001) (discussing the Dale
case).
40. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
41. Id. at 569 (quoting W. Va. Bd of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).
42. Id.
43. In the context of discussing the peculiarity of the application of Massachusetts’
public accommodation law, the Court concedes that expression inheres in both the
individual paraders and the parade collectively:
“In the case before us . . . the Massachusetts law has been applied in a peculiar
way . . . . The disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit
carrying its own banner. Since every participating unit affects the message
conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts’ application of the statute
produced an order essentially requiring petitioners [Council] to alter the
expressive content of their parade. Although the state courts spoke of the
parade as a place of public accommodation, once the expressive character of both
the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent
that the state court’s application of the statute had the effect of declaring the
sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.”
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D. Compelled Speech Through Attribution of Audience Construction

Alternatively, the parade bystanders, or audience, could be
constructors of meaning attributable to the Council. This conception
of speech yields two different perspectives on the Council’s “speech.”
First, it could support the theory that the Council was forced to speak
by virtue of the Massachusetts public accommodation law’s
requirement that the Council organize and conduct a parade
containing a message the Council did not wish to convey (i.e., GLIB’s
values). This is a negative speech claim, and as such, the Council can
only identify that which it prefers not to speak. Second, this
conception of speech could mean that the Council “spoke” a
circumstantial, thematic parade message only to the extent that it was
received and constructed as such in the minds of bystanders along the
way. The meaning of this message develops within the audience’s
collective mind (and despite the Council’s best intentions to the
contrary).
If the speech claim in Hurley is based on the theory that the state
statute forced the Council to speak GLIB’s message – a requirement
that the council say something it did not intend to say – the claim is
necessarily grounded in an intention or purpose-based speech
analysis. This theory would rest not on the message of the organizer,
but on the fact that the state law forced GLIB’s message on the
parade (which, incidentally, suggests that GLIB is a speaker).
Conversely, if the speech claim in Hurley is based on the idea
that the Council speaks the parade’s circumstantial, thematic message
as received and constructed in the audience’s mind, then purpose and
intention are not implicated. The logic of this claim necessarily
assumes that GLIB’s participation in the parade emits signifying
force. This signifying force will result in an identifiable pro-gay and
lesbian message that those witnessing the parade will perceive a
particular pro-gay and lesbian message upon witnessing GLIB’s
participation. The result is that such message will in fact be perceived
by audience members as the Council’s intentional or purposeful
endorsement of GLIB’s values. In short, the parade’s message is
constructed by the audience and then attributed to the Council as
speaker.
Under this view, the Council’s status as a speaker is not
offensive, but defensive. The Council is not creating an identifiable
and purposeful message, but instead claims the right not to be forced

Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
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to speak a message that will (allegedly) inevitably be attributed to it
by others – a message not known at the time of the Council’s
selection act. In short, the Council’s message seems inescapably
bound to the audience and the circumstances of the parade, from
which themes of patriotism, pride, and/or an endorsement of GLIB
would presumably emerge. This confers great power upon the
audience as a central and necessary factor in determining the message
at issue.
In determining whether the Council alleged a valid speech claim,
the Court asks whether “the Council, like a cable operator, is merely
a ‘conduit’ for the speech of participants in the parade ‘rather than
itself a speaker.’”44 The Court answers its own question in the
negative:”[T]his metaphor is not apt here, because GLIB’s
participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the
Council’s customary determination . . . [that GLIB’s message, like
others in the parade], was worthy of presentation and quite possibly
of support as well.”45
The Court adjudicates the question of whether the Council
qualifies as a “conduit” by looking to audience perception. The
Court speculates – without any evidence – about likely audience
perception and uses that construct to determine whether the Council
is a conduit or not. Thus, the attachment of a message to the Council
would be a product of the bystanders’ interpretation alone, as would
be the message deemed to be carried by the participant. This is a
purely interpretive and constructed message, resting in no significant
way on purpose or intention of the “speaker,” the composer,
organizer, or whatever we might call the Council.46 Moreover, the
Court’s explanation rests upon premises that are ultimately
inconsistent with its earlier insistence on the Council’s expressive
intentions.47
On what basis does the Court rest its conclusion that attribution
of GLIB’s message to the Council will occur with the parade? With
cable television, the Court says, “there appears little risk the cable
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable
system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.”48
44. Id. at 575.
45. Id.
46. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court used similar reasoning in
the absence of any evidence that other drivers would interpret Maynard’s license plate as
expressing his own view.
47. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the Council’s claimed speaker status).
48. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
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“In contrast,” the Court says,
parades and demonstrations . . . are not understood to be so
neutrally presented or selectively viewed. . . . Although each
parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to
contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly there is
no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow “any
identity of viewpoint” between themselves and the selected
49
participants.

The absence of disavowal, however, does not necessarily imply
avowal or endorsement. An audience’s construction of meaning is an
obstreperous and circumstantial basis upon which to support such a
facile assumption. Apparently sensing this, the Court undercuts its
own conclusion: “Without deciding on the precise significance of the
likelihood of misattribution,” the Court insists that, “the parade’s
overall message is distilled from individual presentations along the
way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by spectators as part of the
50
whole.”
In the Court’s view, attribution seems to be largely, if not solely,
a function of either the accepted practice and understanding on the
part of the audience or Justice Souter’s beliefs about the audience’s
interpretation.
The “common experience” attribution and
interpretation is a method used analytically by the Court also to draw
something of a line between cable programs and parade segments.
This line is notably not drawn on the basis of substantive principle or
expressive policy, but instead only on the (potentially idiosyncratic)
interpretation of various relevant audiences or sets of bystanders. In
the absence of any empirical evidence, this is a fragile, and even
reckless, foundation upon which to rest an exceedingly expansive
conception of constructed speech.
Ultimately, an approach that uses the concept of “audience
perception” and attribution to determine and stabilize the meaning of
an expressively ambiguous message is in high conflict with the Court’s
continuous and adamant attention to the “message” derived from
Council’s authorship of that message in the course of its selection
decisions. The Council may have disapproved of GLIB’s message. It
may have rejected it out of pure distaste for the ideas and values
GLIB represented. But the Council’s claim is not a constitutional
right to act on one’s own prejudices. It is instead a right of free

49. Id.
50. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
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speech. Such a claim requires that the Council speak, not just act.
Distaste, alone, is not speech.

II. The Multiple Theories of Speech and Communication in
Hurley
To understand Hurley as an instance of First Amendment
speech, one must not only identify precisely what the Council’s
speech acts consisted of, but also how the Council’s speech acts fit
into an underlying idea of expression. To do this, we situate the
Hurley case within different speech and communication theories and
compare them to the Court’s reasoning. The four views discussed
here are not an exhaustive inventory of the forms communication
may take, but they represent a fair spectrum of competing ideas. The
views are reflected in the work of J. L. Austin, E. D. Hirsch, John
Peters, and James Carey.
A. J.L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory
1.

Explanation of Austin’s Theory

J.L. Austin’s overarching speech act theory introduced a
category of language called the “performative.”51 These statements
do not simply describe or report facts. Rather performative
statements are acts, in and of themselves.52 When results or
consequences are brought about by saying something, then the
speaker can be said to use language in the performative sense. The
performative statement is qualitatively distinct from a statement that
simply reports facts. The latter type of statement, once heard, may
change someone’s course of action later in time. But when the
former is issued and understood, then certain effects are immediately
obtained. For example, if one articulates a descriptive statement of
fact, such as “it is forty degrees outside,”53 the receiver of that
statement may rely on that information and, thus, choose to put on a
coat. But that consequence is not a necessary response or effect of
the utterance. The doing of the act is not achieved by the speech.
Statements with a greater degree of illocutionary force, and hence,
51. J.L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words 6 (J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà
eds.), 2d ed. (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1975).
52. Id. at 6-7 (explaining that the name “performative” “is derived . . . from
‘perform’, . . . it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action –
it is not normally thought of as just saying something”) (emphasis added).
53. Austin refers to verifiable statements of fact – statements that do nothing in
themselves, or that have no necessary force – as “constative” statements. Id. at 1-3.
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performative quality, include statements such as, “I promise to pay
you five dollars in exchange for your hat.” Assuming this statement is
uttered in the appropriate context, it constitutes a promise and,
perhaps, even a legally actionable contract. Performative statements
are performative because a relationship or structure has congealed
between the statement, uttered with the requisite intention and in the
appropriate speech situation (i.e., context), such that effect
necessarily attends the speech.
Though Austin concedes that there is no such thing as a “pure”
performative54 – there are only uses of language with more or less
illocutionary force according to the speech situations in which the
expression is uttered – his notion of the performative documents
something important about the nature of language: that sometimes
speech and act are so tangled as to be inextricably intertwined. First
Amendment jurisprudence likewise noted this oddity about speech
and conduct, and the fact that utterances issued in particular contexts
can have powerful, material effects. For example, the law of
incitement reveals a belief in the (sometimes) inextricable quality of
speech and conduct. Under the old rule of Shenck v. United States,55
the Court assumed that some words, uttered in particular
circumstances, were so dangerous as to create a material danger

54. Some background discussion of Austin’s speech act theory is in order here. When
Austin began the Harvard lecture series documented in the book, How To Do Things
With Words, he crafted a dichotomy between a performative and constative statement,
suggesting that no overlap existed between the two senses of speech. Id. at 1-11. By the
end of the lecture series, Austin rejects this dichotomy in favor of a more generalized
speech act theory that tracks the various degrees of illocutionary force effected by all sorts
of statements:
We said long ago that we needed a list of “explicit performative verbs”; but in the
light of the more general theory we now see that what we need is a list of
illocutionary forces of an utterance. The old distinction, however, between
primary and explicit will survive the sea-change from the performative/constative
distinction to the theory of speech-acts quite successfully. For we have since seen
reason to suppose that . . . [we can sort] out those verbs which make explicit . . .
the illocutionary force of an utterance. . . . What will not survive the transition . . .
is the notion of the purity of performatives: this was essentially based upon a
belief in the dichotomy of performatives and constatives, which we see has to be
abandoned in favour of more general families of related and overlapping speech
acts . . . .
Id. at 149-50. For additional discussion of Austin’s speech act theory and a critique of the
constative/performative dichotomy, see generally Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes
Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies 37-67
(Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press 1989).
55. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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(usually a tendency to cause unrest and violence). Under the modern
56
Brandenburg v. Ohio standard, courts judge incitement by asking
whether a speaker’s advocacy would direct or incite imminent
lawlessness. The immediacy requirement only allows for a very small
temporal separation, if any, between that which constitutes speech
and that which constitutes conduct. This reflects the view that some
expression achieves a conduct-like status because the expression has
force, that is, inevitable and real consequences.
The same speech/conduct entanglement subtends the doctrine of
fighting words. Under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,57 the Court
allowed the state to regulate words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight. The Court defined “words likely to cause . . .
fight” as words that (1) are likely to incite an immediate fight (again,
the temporal requirement between word and resulting action is
extremely tight), or (2) words that themselves “inflict injury.”58 In
short, these are words that effect a force equivalent to a physical
blow, and that capability turns on the belief that such words possess a
uniquely powerful force when uttered in a particular context.
Finally, it is important to note that, unlike the incitement and
fighting words doctrines, where a speech act is regulated because its
effects are both forceful and harmful, often the Supreme Court
protects an instance of conduct precisely because its communicative
aspect is so forceful. For instance, in flag desecration cases the Court
has consistently held that the nation’s flag holds significant symbolic
content.59 Burning that particular object necessarily conveys a
political message that the flag burner disapproves of the state’s
message of unity and patriotism. As such, flag burning may thus
qualify as speech under the First Amendment. The illustration
inverts Austin’s theory somewhat: the flag burner engages in an act
that cannot but “speak,” or signify, where as speech act theory posits
that a speech cannot but “act,” or effect illocutionary force. But the
speech and act are inextricable under both views and so causation
runs both ways.
2.

Austin’s Theory Applied to Hurley: Alternative Resolutions of the Case

Austin’s understanding of the performative shifts the quality of
the communicative phenomena that took place in Hurley, and thus
56. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
57. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
58. Id. at 571-72, 573.
59. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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bears on possibilities for resolving the case. The Supreme Court
could have used Austin’s theory to conclude that the (GLIB)
marchers were entitled to no constitutional protection. According to
Austin, the explicitly performative statement encompasses a speech
act wherein speech effects a high degree of force. It is at least
arguable that, as the individual paraders marched along in procession,
their individual units generated no real illocutionary force. That is to
say, the pride, entertainment value, or any other values
communicated by the parade were not generated by, or intrinsic to, a
single marching entity. To the extent that the individual parade units
engaged in communication with no illocutionary force, their speech
acts approach the roughly synonymous legal realm of non-expressive
“conduct,” which raises no First Amendment issues.
First
Amendment protection would only extend to conduct with
substantial illocutionary force, that is, situations where conduct
remains inseparable from signification. Thus, under Austin’s theory,
the Court was right to conclude that the Veteran’s Council had the
right to combine multifarious voices and/or edit their themes
according to its private dictates and without regard to the speech
interests of GLIB. It was also correct to conclude that “every
participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private
60
61
organizers” and that parades “make some sort of collective point.”
In the alternative, the Court could have conceded that the
individual parade units evinced some small degree of illocutionary
force. Imagine if GLIB had marched down the street by itself.
Considered in isolation, not within the context of the large procession
that is Boston’s parade, the significance of one small marching unit
cannot possibly match that of the entire parade taken collectively.
GLIB might look extremely silly – indeed, out of order and arbitrary
– should it decide to parade randomly down the street, accompanied
by no other parade units. Nor does GLIB’s expression, as an
individual unit, have an impact or force of meaning that matches the
magnitude of signification inherent in, for example, flag burning
committed on the steps of a capitol building. In short, GLIB would
speak, but in a whisper.
Under either premise, GLIB’s interest in marching may legally
be subjected to or trumped by the First Amendment interest of the
Council. The Council’s composition of the parade, which included its
particular speech selection judgments, can qualify as a speech act with

60. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
61. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
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great, indeed primary, illocutionary force. Because the Council’s
announcement of GLIB’s disqualification performs the very act that
it states and immediately effects the exclusion of GLIB, the Council’s
judgment carries great weight, backed by the force of the juridical
state.62 The Council’s speech act can therefore be privileged above
GLIB’s alleged speech interest.
3.

The Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court viewed the parade as a form of robust
expression, not conduct. It characterized parades in general as
“public drama[s] of social relations” that make a “collective point.”63
It held that parades constitute “a form of expression, not just
64
Characterized this way, the parade itself constitutes
motion.”
speech. The parade itself thus becomes the focus of the Court’s
analysis, rather than the Council’s speech selection judgment (which
Austin’s theory would have directed the Court to examine).
After deciding that a parade makes a general collective point –
rather than a bundle of specific, identifiable messages65—the Court
also found an “inherent expressiveness [in] marching” that is
symbolic.66 Yet, by participating in the Council’s parade, the Court
argued that GLIB necessarily “seeks to communicate its ideas as part
of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its own.”67
Inferentially, the Court did not view GLIB’s participation as an act of
speaking through the parade, even though the Court concedes that
GLIB was, in fact, “communicating its ideas.”68 On this basis, the
Court decided that the Council was necessarily “the” speaker, rather
than GLIB or any of the other parade contingents.
But the conclusion that the Council is the speaker, by default,
does not follow. If the Court is right that marching is not mere
62. That is, the Council is the sole holder of the parade permit granted by the city of
Boston. It has sole discretion over the selection of parade participants. The Council’s
decision is final. Id. at 560-61.
63. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. This presents an interesting contrast to (or inconsistency with) the Court’s
decision in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), where
the Chamber of Commerce’s endorsement of a candidate could be seen to make a
collective point, but the “point” made did not count as speech of the members, because all
of the members of the Chamber did not endorse it. Similarly, how can a parade make a
collective point, and thus count as speech, if, as seems inevitable, all of the marchers
participating in it do not endorse the point?
66. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
67. Id. at 570.
68. Id.
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motion – that it is inherently expressive69 – then each individual
marcher (including the excluded GLIB members) deserves First
Amendment protection, for the messages of each and all of them are
distinct but are still expressive communication. They are part of the
collective point made by the parade. In this sense the “point” is not
prescribed in advance, with the marchers all subscribing to it, but
instead arises from the parade itself as a collective practice that has
gained cultural and political significance as a form of communication
across various historical moments.
While this insight about parades may be right, the Court’s initial
premise would seem to concede the argument that the Council’s
selection judgments do not uniquely cause a collective point to be
made. Indeed, even absent a permit-granting process – for example,
if the parade were run by the city and everyone could participate – a
collective, multifarious message could still be extrapolated from the
combination of the multiple paraders’ voices. If act and speech are
not inextricably intertwined in the Council’s (de)selection act, then
the Council’s speech selection judgment has little communicative
force; its process of denying permits looks more like pure conduct
than speech, and should not receive First Amendment protection.
If the Court did in fact believe that act and speech were
inextricably intertwined in the Council’s (de)selection act, no
evidence of this fact exists in the opinion. Nothing mentioned by the
Court would provide support for the conclusion that the Council’s
speech act (i.e., the selection process) qualifies as an explicitly
performative statement to trump the historically sedimented meaning
that inheres in most forms of marching as a kind of expressive
conduct. If a parade’s message is social, dramatic, and thematic,
arising from an entrenched historical appreciation for the cultural
significance of marching, it seems unlikely that the Council’s intended
message – be it vague or specific – could consist of anything more
than its own mental construct, bearing no real significance to the
parade. This is particularly true given the fact that GLIB participated
70
in the parade the previous year. Furthermore, it makes little sense
that the Council should get credit as the preeminent speaker just
because it takes individual paraders’ messages and allegedly
transforms them, by virtue of granting or denying a permit, into some
later constructed collective point.
Ultimately, the Court’s decision resonates with Austin’s notion
69. Id. at 568.
70. Id. at 561.
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of the performative at times, but the Court fails consistently to deploy
this conception of speech. The Court’s decision positioned the
Council as the preeminent message organizer not by virtue of the
illocutionary force inherent in speech selection judgments, but rather,
by default. The Court impliedly held that the marchers’ specific
messages were constitutive of the Council’s message, and thus
subordinate to it. The Council thus received ownership over all the
marchers’ speech.
B.

E.D. Hirsch’s Theory of Authorial Intent

1.

Explanation of Hirsch’s Theory

E.D. Hirsch established authorial intent as the prevailing
normative guideline for evaluating the interpretation of (literary)
texts.71 He defined authorial intent as the author or speaker’s
intended message72 – an orientation which assumes an identifiable
message and a singularly or arguably “best” interpretation of a text.
Hirsch chose this rubric because one must be able to stabilize
meaning and then judge it according to systematically reliable
principles.73 Through doing this, one enables the possibility of
assessment. Using the notion of intent as one’s measuring stick,
Hirsch predicted that authorial intent would typically bring readers,
interpreters, or other assessors to the most correct understanding of a
text, if not to a perfect understanding.74 Put differently, Hirsch’s
theory grounded the possibility of determinate meaning in a human’s
preexisting determinate will to share a message. While the scope or
specificity of the intended message remains unclear, for Hirsch, no
principle better stabilizes meaning than intent.75
In a very similar fashion, First Amendment law also relies on the
notion of intent for the purposes of making legal determinations of
authorship and meaning. Traditional free speech jurisprudence
assumes that meaning can be stabilized and determinate, that
speakers either intend or do not intend certain meanings, and that the
constitutionality of a given message should be assessed using that
intent. For instance, in Cohen v. California,76 the Court entertained a
71. Eric Donald Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, 5-6 (1967).
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 207.
74. Id. at 17.
75. As such, Hirsch’s theory of authorial intent is framed as a “defense of the
author.” Id. at 1.
76. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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lengthy inquiry into Cohen’s intention or reason for wearing a jacket
bearing the words “Fuck the Draft.” Under the first prong of the
77
Spence v. Washington test, the Court asked whether a speaker
intended to convey a particular message. In her concurring opinion in
78
Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor penned the “endorsement”
test and asked, inter alia, whether the speaker (the government in that
case) intended to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion.
These cases discussing the legal doctrine of intent illustrate the
fact that an intention-based theory presumes a single, identifiable
speaker, an assumption not readily applicable to a case such as
79
Hurley, which involves potentially multiple and competing speakers.
But intent might serve as a means of identifying the primary speaker;
that is, the party whose expressive act can be given stable meaning
and priority.
2.

Hirsch’s Theory Applied to Hurley – Alternative Resolutions of the Case

Under Hirsch’s theory, the threshold question in Hurley must be
whether any of the contending parties/speakers intended to speak an
There are two primary ways of
identifiable message.80
conceptualizing this question. The first would be to view the Council
as the only entity with the intent to speak an identifiable message.
But there is no reason to adopt such a limited view, especially given
the difficulty in attaching a specific intent and message to the
Council’s selection acts. Additionally this is difficult given the fact
that other parties, including GLIB, clearly asserted an intent to
express a message.
Thus, a second approach would be to view the Council, GLIB,
and other parade participants as individuals or entities who can claim
an intent to speak an identifiable message. This alternative view
involves dueling intents that require their resolution. GLIB arguably
intended to celebrate its members’ identity as openly gay, lesbian,
bisexual descendents of Irish immigrants and to include its members
as part of the larger group whose diverse history, traditions, and
77. 418 U.S. 405, 413-15 (1974).
78. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
79. See supra Part I (discussing the multiple speakers and forms of speech in Hurley).
80. Actually, for Hirsch, there are always two burning questions. First, what did the
speaker/author intend to say or accomplish? Second, did the speaker/author effective in
achieving that objective? Id. at 12. The second question suggests that Hirsch’s theory
might disqualify a speaker from First Amendment protection if it failed to accomplish its
stated purpose. Of course, Hirsch does not speak to the First Amendment specifically, so
we cannot be sure.
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beliefs were being re-presented by the participants in the parade.81
GLIB distributed a fact sheet explaining its members’ intention to
celebrate this exact message.82 In contrast, the Council publicized no
express or identifiable message — certainly no message that GLIB
wittingly consented to as a condition of its participation.
Characterized this way, and assessed under Hirsch’s rubric of
authorial intent, it appears that only GLIB intended to communicate
a message, and therefore, technically, GLIB is the only entity eligible
for speakership under this characterization. GLIB publicized its
intent to articulate a meaningful and identifiable message; GLIB
marchers would (presumably) physically speak or display messages
while marching. The Council itself did neither.
The Council did, of course, organize the parade and select the
participants. But an intent to do these things would not satisfy
Hirsch’s conception of intent nor qualify the Council as a speaker
whose claim could subordinate that of GLIB. To trump GLIB’s
interests, the Council must, at the very least, intend to express some
message or express its own disagreement with one (like GLIB’s). The
fact that a parade is inherently expressive cannot, without more,
bootstrap the Council into the category of “speaker” under Hirsch’s
theory. Without more by way of intent and message, the parade is an
83
event, not speech, and the Council is an actor, not a speaker.
3.

The Court’s Reasoning

Ultimately, the Hurley Court conferred speakership upon the
Council because (a) the Council was a private organizer; (b) a
speaker is not required to generate, as an original matter, each item
featured in the communication (i.e., republishers may be entitled to
First Amendment protection when they only select speech originally
produced by others); (c) the selection of contingents to make a
parade is an act of authorship intended to create a collective message;
and (d) GLIB’s application for participation in this particular parade
disqualifies it as a speaker. That is, GLIB intended to “communicate
its ideas as part of the existing parade, rather than [stage] one of its

81. 515 U.S. at 570.
82. Id.
83. Cable operators and newspapers, which the Court discussed, could still
conceivably be “speakers” entitled to First Amendment protection under this theory, since
the cable operators and papers have an intent to select, edit, and circulate certain
messages or texts as their own expression. See Randall Bezanson, The Developing Law of
Editorial Judgment, 78 Nebr. L. Rev. 754 (1999).
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own.”84 GLIB was therefore treated as constructively disclaiming any
intent to speak its own message by virtue of applying as a participant
in the Council’s parade. This left no competing speech claimant for
the Council and thus meant that the Council’s relatively ambiguous
speech intention prevailed by default.
While the Court offers justifications to explain why it privileges
the Council as the speaker, it does not do this by relying on the
traditional doctrine of speaker intent. Instead, the Court begins from
the premise that parades and marching constitute speech and
implicitly addresses the question of intent:
To be sure, we agree with the state courts that in spite of excluding
some applicants, the Council is rather lenient in admitting
participants. But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive
subject matter of the speech. Nor . . . does First Amendment
protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each
item featured in the communication. [Similar to a cable operator or
newspaper editor,] [t]he selection of contingents to make a parade
85
is entitled to First Amendment protection.

In answering GLIB’s argument that speakers only receive First
Amendment protection when their messages contain identifiable
messages, the Court elides the question of intent and simply reasserts
that speech selection judgments have been protected under First
Amendment precedent.86 However, it does not explain why this is so.
The only warrant the Court provides for its decision to grant the
Council speaker status is the Court’s analogy among cable operators,
newspapers, and parade organizers.87 But later in the opinion, the
Court spends a great deal of time explaining that the Council, in fact,
is much different than a cable operator:
Respondents contend . . . that the admission of GLIB to the parade
would not threaten the core principle of speaker autonomy because

84. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 570-71.
86. Id. at 570.
87. See the Court’s statement at a later point in the opinion that “[a] newspaper,
similarly, ‘is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for the news, comment and
advertising,’ and we have held that ‘the choice of material . . . and the decisions made as to
limitations on size and content . . . and treatment of public issues . . . constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Id. at 575. While the analogy is more drawn
out here, the Court still fails to explain why the characteristics of the paradigmatic
newspaper editor apply equally to that of a parade organizer.
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the Council, like a cable operator, is merely “a conduit” for the
speech of participants in the parade “rather than itself a speaker.”
But this metaphor is not apt here, because GLIB’s participation
would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s
customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that
its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of
88
support as well.

It is difficult to pin down any warrant, much less an explicit one,
as to why the Council’s speech selection judgments are protected.
While the Court elides the question of the Council’s intent, the
Court explicitly discusses GLIB’s intent and construes those
statements against GLIB’s interests. First, the Court concedes that
GLIB’s participation in the parade was “equally expressive” to the
Coucil:
GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in [the
parade] . . . in order to celebrate its members’ identity as openly
gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to
show that there are such individuals in the community, and to
support the like men and women who sought to march in the New
York parade. . . .
The organization distributed a fact sheet
describing the members’ intentions, and the record otherwise
89
corroborates the expressive nature of GLIB’s participation.

Yet somehow, GLIB’s statements function as evidence of an
intent to contribute to a collective point at the expense of GLIB’s
intended, individualized point – almost like a waiver of First
Amendment speaker status. The Council is thus allowed to prevail as
the speaker by default.
Finally, the Court argues that Hurley is about autonomy, more
than anything else. Again skirting around the question of why the
Council deserves speaker status, the Court likens the Council to a
composer:
Petitioners’ claim to the benefit of this principle of autonomy to
control one’s own speech is as sound as the South Boston parade is
expressive. Rather like a composer, the Council selects the
expressive units of the parade from the potential participants, and
though the score may not produce a particularized message, each
contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports with what
merits celebration on that day. . . . The Council clearly decided to
invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by

88. Id. at 575.
89. Id. at 570.
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speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another. . . . [I]t
boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular
90
point of view.

While it may be clear enough that the Council is a private entity,
the metaphorical alignment between a composer and the Council fails
to articulate a coherent reason as to why the Council’s speech
selection judgment cancels out other potential speakers and forms of
speech. At best, the composer metaphor imports an uncritical
assumption into the Hurley equation: that the Council necessarily
must have had an intent to speak because a composer always has an
intent to compose music.
In short, the Court equates the Council’s selection judgments
with an intent to speak that liberates the requirement of a specific,
intended message or even an express agreement or endorsement by
the Council and so implies that intention inherently resides in parades
(not speakers). It then uses the traditional element of intent to
disqualify GLIB as a speaker. The opinion offers no doctrinal reason
grounded in intent that explains why, for the purposes of the First
Amendment, the Council deserves credit as a speaker.
C.
1.

John Peters’ Theory of Communication as Dissemination
Explanation of Peters’ Theory

John Peters discusses a model of communication that views
communicative activity through the metaphor of a one-way broadcast
to which there exists a general access.91 This communication-asdissemination model is indifferent to its receivers, which is not to say
that receivers are of no relevance.92 It means that all receivers are

90. Id. at 574.
91. John Durham Peters, Speaking into The Air: A History of the Idea of
Communication 61 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Christian doctrine of communication is a
doctrine of broadcasting, of single turns, expended without the expectation that one good
turn deserves another”).
92. Id. at 51. Some mention of Peters’ larger objective is in order here. Peters’
ultimate project is one of “staging a debate between the greatest proponent of dialogue,
Socrates, and the most enduring voice for dissemination, Jesus.” Id. at 34-35. The effect
of this contrast is to forestall many of the contemporary controversies around and over
“communication,” most of which, Peters argues, characterize good communication as
dialog. Peters’ historical sketch documents how dialog earns the status of “cure all” for a
variety of modern longings (including physical distance, emotional distance, cultural and
other differences, etc.). Id. at 1-31. Peters seeks to trouble this “cure all’ conception of
communication and the hyper-emphasis on dialog. He moves “beyond the often uncritical

2002]

SPEAKING OUT OF THIN AIR

173

equally desirable, and the model relinquishes any investment in (or
control over) the meanings that highly diverse audiences may assign
to the message.93 The theory never maintains that audiences
uniformly receive messages. Whereas Austin’s model locates the
creation of meaning within the text itself (as interpreted within a
certain context) and Hirsch calibrates the evaluation of meaning with
the construct of authorial intent, the Peters model locates meaningmaking primarily within audiences themselves.94 The conditions of
possibility in which the relevant audience(s) circulate determine the
degrees of intelligibility and, thus the significance or insignificance of
a message. In fact, the model does not presume that any given
message will, in fact, get taken up by those on whom it falls.95
Ultimately, the dissemination model values the sheer expenditure of
the seeds of communication because that activity distributes, or
plants, the roots for engagement in democratic practices.96

celebration of dialogue to inquire more closely into what kinds of communicative forms
are most apt for a democratic polity and ethical life.” Id. at 35. Peters’ uses the “parables
attributed to ‘Jesus’ by the synoptic Gospels” not because he wants to focus on historical
Jesus “but rather the afterlife of these figures in specific texts written by their canonical
disciples.” Id. at 35. In particular, Peters highlights the parable of the sower, which
features, “a rhetoric of sowing and harvesting . . . this rhetoric often celebrates
dissemination as desirable and just. The parable of the sower—the archparable of
dissemination—presents a mode of distribution that is as democratically indifferent to who
may receive the precious seeds.” Peters, supra n. 91, at 51.
93. Id. at 51-52.
The parable of the sower . . . enacts its point in the form of its saying, performing
its own modus operandi. The diverse audience members, like the varieties of
soils, who hear the parable as told by the seashore are left to make of it what they
will. It is a parable about the diversity of audience interpretations in settings that
lack direct interaction. . . . [T]he sower celebrates broadcasting as an equitable
mode of communication that leaves the harvest of meaning to the will and
capacity of the recipient. . . . [¶] The meaning of the parable is quite literally the
audience’s problem.
94. Id. at 52 (stating that, in the parable of the sower, “the audience bears the
interpretive burden” and that “[i]t becomes the hearer’s responsibility to close the loop
without the aid of the speaker”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 53-62. Peters contends that the dissemination model balances out the
hyper-emphasis on dialog because it forms the basis for more democratic and ethical life.
In explaining the democratizing effect of dissemination, Peters states:
Plato’s version of Socrates privileges a private and esoteric mode of
communication [i.e., dialectic or dialog]. In the intimate setting of dialectic the
receiver is carefully selected by the speaker in advance and carefully brought to
understand. . . . [O]nly an elite few were admitted . . . Jesus, in contrast, performs
a radically public, exoteric mode of dispersing meanings – even though the
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
disseminating information broadly and seems to comprehend the
notion of broadcasting as sheer expenditure. This is particularly
evident in its decisions relating to commercial speech and to
indecency bans on communications media. For example, in FCC v.
97
Pacifica Foundation, the Court noted the sheer pervasiveness of
radio broadcasts. Additionally, the Court clearly rejects total
indecency bans in the medium of radio broadcasting, by suggesting
that it values dissemination and realizing that the radio operates as a
more pure technology of dissemination rather than as a platform for
reciprocal communicative exchange, such as the telephone.98
Likewise, under today’s commercial speech doctrine, purely
commercial speech receives First Amendment protection because the
public wants and needs a free flow of truthful information.99 The
rationale in these cases is simply that the information ought be made
available, not as an exercise of the advertiser’s freedom, but in order
that its audiences have the opportunity to make what they will of it.100
2.

Peters’ Theory Applied to Hurley – Alternative Resolutions of the Case

Whether the medium is newspaper advertisements, radio
broadcasts, or price tags, the Court and Peters agree that
dissemination of information is a crucial prerequisite to fertile
democracy.101 If we apply Peters’ theory to Hurley, however, it
becomes evident that the value of dissemination itself was not
determinative of the Court’s decision.
Under the communication-as-dissemination model, the parade
arguably constitutes a technology of dissemination because listeners
or receivers enjoy a general access to the unidirectional message(s)
aired. Viewers of the parade need only stand on the sidelines, or
hearers often fail to catch the hint – in which the audience sorts out the
significance for itself . . . The synoptic Gospels repeatedly undercut reciprocal
and hermetic relations in favor of relations that are asymmetrical and public.
Id., supra n. 91, at 53.
97. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
98. See, e.g. Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
99. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Linmark Assoc’s, Inc. v. Willingboro Tp., 431 U.S. 85
(1977).
100. See Randall Bezanson, The Pharmacist: Speech and Its Consumers, Speech Stories
155-86 (1998).
101. Of course, Peters’ conception of what constitutes “democracy” is much more
radical than that entertained by the U.S. Supreme Court. See supra n. 96 at 53-62.
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perhaps watch the parade on television. Parades are a medium whose
historically politicized form and typically public appearance tend to
advertise the views expressed. The disseminator’s purpose or
intention is not the message’s source of meaning: neither of these
need to be pinned down for speech or a speaker to qualify as a
technology of dissemination. That being said, however, two potential
speakers exist in Hurley: the individual marchers or entities
participating in the parade, and the composer of the parade (i.e., the
Council).
If the parade itself qualifies as First Amendment speech under
Peters’ theory, it seems likely that the individual marchers or entities
participating in the parade ought be protected as speakers, if only on
the consequentialist ground that one cannot have a parade without
paraders. In that sense, the human body functions as a technology of
dissemination, and ought be protected vigorously even though it
presents the case of an “organic” technology. An intended message is
not needed to qualify the marchers as a technology of dissemination,
since perhaps only the foreknowledge that their acts will be perceived
as communicating some kind of message will be sufficient.
The Council’s speech selection behavior might also qualify as
First Amendment speaking, at least to the extent that the behavior is
intended to function as a technology of dissemination of the other
marchers’ speech. Under the dissemination model, speech selection
decisions in general might rise to the level of protected speech – even
though selection necessarily involves the exclusion of some speech –
since those decisions are a necessary precondition given spatial
constraints or the constraints of a competitive marketplace. This
presents yet another consequentialist rationale that fits neatly with
Peters’ dissemination model.
However, if the Council’s attempts to exclude parties such as
GLIB can be viewed as exclusionary or akin to soft censorship, then
its behavior qualifies as something less than sheer dissemination and
perhaps qualifies as antidemocratic for Peters. More basically, if the
Council’s exclusion is alleged to result from the Council’s intent to
disavow a specific message, then the Council’s action may no longer
qualify as dissemination under Peters’ view. The Council as censor –
a shaper of its specific message at the cost of other’s messages – may
have no privileged place in a world that regards dissemination so
highly.
If both the Council’s speech selection judgments and the parade
marchers arguably fall within the umbrella of the First Amendment, a
theoretical orientation, such as Peters’ model, that values
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technologies of dissemination as building blocks of a more democratic
culture might ask whether one of the two parties with potential
speech interests is most analogous to a pure technology of
dissemination or which communicative practice seems most integral
to radically public, democratic participation. The paraders’ speech
claims arguably fall closer to a pure technology of dissemination,
primarily because Peters’ theory privileges the receiver and the
distinctness of human beings in the intractable process of meaning
creation.102 Peters’ theoretical apparatus favors exoteric, not elitist,
modes of communication.103
3.

The Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court argued in Hurley that parades, unlike cable
lines, operate as more than “conduits” for the dissemination of
information, which suggests that the Court views the parade as more
than a mere technology of dissemination.104 Rather than derive the
First Amendment privilege of a parade purely from its capacity to
function as a technology of dissemination, the Court articulated two
different grounds for protecting the parade as expression. First,
unlike a cable transmission, which involves no substantive message
contributed by the cable operator’s channel carriage decisions, a
parade constitutes speech because it makes a “point,” or
communicates a new message tailored by the Council’s selection
choices.105 Second, the Court emphasized that the parade deserved
protection (unlike cable operators dealt with in Turner Broadcasting

102. Peters, supra n. 91, at 269-71
No real community endures without touch. Of all the senses, touch is the most
resistant to being made into a medium of recording or transmission. It remains
stubbornly wed to the proximate.
.

.

.

Being there still matters . . . [A]ll things being equal, people who care for each
other will seek each other’s presence.
.

.

.

The face of the other is the strong force. . . . Because we share our mortal time
and touch only with some and not all, presence becomes the closest thing there is
to a guarantee of a bridge across the chasm.”
103. See supra n. 96, at 53-62.
104. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
105. Id. (likening the Council’s decision to editorial license).
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106
v. FCC ) because it did not threaten the very survival of certain
speakers’ messages.107 GLIB, after all, could hold its own parade.
The Court’s attempt to distinguish the Council from cable
operators and newspapers makes little sense considering its reliance
on an analogy among the three earlier in the opinion,108 where it
reasoned that the Council exercised editorial judgment similar to that
of a cable operator or a newspaper editor. In order to argue that the
parade constitutes speech, the Court has to say that the Council is
totally different from the cable operator or newspaper editor. Yet, in
order to argue that the Council’s speech selection judgment
constitutes protected speech, the Court has to say that the Council is
highly similar to the cable operator or newspaper editor. As such, the
Court refuses to characterize the parade as a technology of
dissemination, yet likens the parade to those figures (newspaper
editors or cable operators) who receive First Amendment protection
due, in large part, to their position as critical disseminators of
communication.

D.

James Carey’s Theory of Communication as Culture

1.

Explanation of Carey’s Theory

The key feature of James Carey’s communication theory is its
cultural perspective. Carey contends that, historically, Americans
conceived of communication “in the idea of transmission:
communication is a process whereby messages are transmitted and
distributed in space for the control of distance and people.”109 But in
Carey’s view, to reduce communication to a mode of transmission is
to unduly and artificially narrow the realm of activity that can be said
to have communicative significance, and to deceive oneself into
believing that humans only communicate for the purpose of sharing
information or getting things done. That is to say, the transmission

106. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
107. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577-78. In Hurley, the Court found that no speakers would be
prevented from speaking if the Court struck down the application of the public
accommodation statute, because the Council did not have the power to silence GLIB the
way cable operators could silence their competing speakers in the cable provider
marketplace. Ultimately, while the “size and success of [the Council’s] parade makes it an
enviable vehicle for the dissemination of GLIB’s views . . . that fact . . . would fall short of
supporting a claim that [the Council] enjoy[s] an abiding monopoly of access to
spectators.” Id.
108. Id. at 570.
109. James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society 15
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
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model treats communication like an instrument – a tool for getting
things done – when in fact communicative activity holds much greater
utility and value than the pundits will admit.
Carey introduces his larger theoretical project against this
historical backdrop, and claims instead that “media of communication
are not merely instruments of will and purpose but definite forms of
life: organisms, so to say, that reproduce in miniature the
contradictions in our thought, action, and social relations,”110
including those contradictions housed within the symbol of the First
Amendment itself.111 In defining communication as “culture,” Carey
widens the very definition of what qualifies as communication beyond
notions of intent or purpose.
Instead, he contends that
“communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced,
Thus, Carey’s model,
maintained, repaired, and transformed.”112
unlike Hirsch’s model, accepts the premise that meaning is socially
constructed. Though humans trade in the currency of words,
words are not the names for things but, . . . things are the signs of
words. Reality is not given, not humanly existent, independent of
language and toward which language stands as a pale refraction.
Rather, reality is brought into existence, is produced, by
communication—by, in short, the construction, apprehension, and
utilization of symbolic forms. Reality, while not a mere function of
symbolic forms, is produced by terministic systems – or by humans
who produce such systems – that focus its existence in specific
113
terms.

In other words, humans can identify semi-stabilized meaning –
shared meaning – through ritualized communication practices, but
stabilized meanings and their structures of reference gain force
through human, ritualistic repetition, and they act back on us with the

110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 6. Carey ties the relevance of his retheorized sense of communication to
the First Amendment:
But the point is this: from the outset a key discourse of American life has
entertained different and contradictory notions of the practice of communication
– one that derives from modern advances in the printing press and transportation
and one that is situated within the ancient theory and practice of the voice. The
contradiction is symbolized, though hardly resolved, by the uneasy juxtaposition
of assembly, speech, and press in the First Amendment.
Id.
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 25.
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power of “truth” in a manner that is always culturally and historically
informed.114
Carey’s shift from a transmission model to a cultural one entails
several implications. First, because humans live in a symbolically
mediated and constructed reality, communication is valuable for
different reasons than might be assumed under, say, Peters’
dissemination model.
Communication becomes “the primary
phenomena of experience,” and warrants more (and different)
attention than it received historically. It includes not only “relations
of property, production, and trade – an economic order,”115 but more
importantly, “the sharing of aesthetic experience, religious ideas,
personal values and sentiments, and intellectual notions – a ritual
order.”116
Second, Carey’s shift means that thought is
predominantly public and social.
It occurs primarily on
blackboards, in dances, and in recited poems. The capacity of
private thought is a derived and secondary talent, one that appears
biographically later in the person and historically later in the
species. Thought is public because it depends on a publicly
117
available stock of symbols.

Thus, Carey’s shift challenges the notion, and the very possibility,
of a “private” speaker.
Third, because thought is a priori derived from a publicly shared
stock of symbols, “problems of communication are linked to
problems of community.”118 Because our habits of communication
entail a participatory process necessarily derived from the republic,
communicative practices are both sources of and resources for
114. Id. at 31: “[T]here is no such thing as communication to be revealed in nature
through some objective method free from the corruption of culture.”
115. Id. at 34.
116. Id. Carey explains:
[A] ritual view conceives communication as a process through which a shared
culture is created, modified, and transformed.
The archetypal case of
communication is ritual and mythology . . . art and literature . . . A ritual view of
communication is directed not toward the extension of messages in space but the
maintenance of society in time . . .; not the act of imparting information or
influence but the creation, representation, and celebration of shared even if
illusory beliefs.
Id.
117. Id. at 28.
118. Id. at 33.
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maintaining and changing the democratic order.
In short, a cultural, ritualistic theory of communication values
expressive activity for the kind of comment it makes about the
relationships between culture and society, or between expressive
forms.119 It values the ways in which “experience is worked into
understanding and then disseminated and celebrated.”120
The Supreme Court understands the premise that
communicative practices are central to the existence of a democratic
polity, in part because linguistic connectivity is a basic element of the
tissue of civility and a precursor to democratic enfranchisement.121
Precisely because of this realization, the Court in NAACP v. Button122
held that membership in the NAACP (plus its affiliates and staff)
constituted a “mode[] of expression and association” protected by the
First Amendment.123 Participation in the organization articulated an
effective political statement (especially given the historical context of
1963) and constituted a legitimate form of political expression.124
Awareness of linkages between communicative practices and
democratic culture may also lend credence to the notion of “low
value” speech articulated most recently by Justice Stevens.125 In
126
and Renton v. Playtime
Young v. American Mini Theatres
127
Theatres, sexually explicit, non-obscene speech was thought to have
less social value than political speech because sexually explicit nonobscene speech failed to occupy a “core” position in relationship to
democracy. Cases from Valentine v. Chrestensen128 to Central Hudson
129
Gas v. Public Service Commission also demonstrate a belief, at least
by a majority of the Court, that commercial speech is less valuable to
a democratic ideal than, for example, traditionally conceived political
speech.

119. See id. at 43.
120. Id. at 44.
121. Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in
America __ (Oxford University Press,1986).
122. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
123. Id. at 448. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the activities of the NAACP are
more akin to conduct than speech, and should not be protected.
124. An illustration of this is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000);
Bezanson, Artifactual Speech, supra . 39.
125. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416-26 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
126. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
127. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
128. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
129. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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Carey’s Theory Applied to Hurley – Alternative Resolutions of the Case

Carey’s theory opens up two distinct understandings in Hurley.
The first is that, if the paraders as a whole effect a collective
expression that captures, in miniature, the Council’s idyllic ritual
order, then the parade ought to function as a political comment on
the Council’s beliefs about the status of social relations. The Council,
as “conductor,” is an entity that holds certain ideas; the parade is the
dramatic embodiment of the idealized ritual order that the Council
imagines. Ostensibly, the Council’s ideal world would exclude GLIB,
or the Ku Klux Klan, as outside the boundaries of a virtuous civic life.
Irrespective of the fact that many people today would find this
message reprehensible, the Council possesses the permit for the
entire parade, which is one historically common procedure for
entering into, and participating in, the (re)construction of social
structures. Since, for Carey, symbolic enactment is something in
which all humans engage, his model of communication might dictate
that civic participation in the form of parading or marching is
inherently ritualistic, symbolic, and therefore inherently human. For
these reasons, it ought not be encroached upon by the government.
Hence, forcing a privately organized parade to grant a permit to
objectionable messages would usurp a basic right. This is, of course,
what the Court ultimately decided.
While this view explains why the parade itself ought be protected
as First Amendment speech, it provides little ground for
characterizing the parade as the Council’s speech. Because the origin
of communication takes on a radically “public” character in Carey’s
theory (and Carey does not explain whether one can ever “own”
words), it is difficult for the Council to find much basis for asserting
preeminent speaker status. The Council may hold a permit to
conduct the parade, but that does not provide us with a First
Amendment based rationale as to why the Council should be granted
dominion over other communicators. Carey’s broad definition of
communication would likely encompass the Council’s speech
selection judgments as inherently expressive, but it would
undoubtedly extend the same to the parade itself and to the
individual marching units. Furthermore, Carey’s cultural theory of
communication does not indicate whether the First Amendment
ought distinguish between an affirmative message and those that are
mere negations (i.e., assertions of the right not to speak), so it does
not explicitly help us prioritize the speakers.
But another possible view exists. If one had to use Carey’s
model as the basis for preferencing either the Council or GLIB’s
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speech rights, the chips would arguably fall in favor of GLIB. First, a
cultural theory of communication would concede that people create
multiple realities, not just one reality. It relinquishes any need to
resolve contradictions resulting from multiple worldviews, and would
point to the First Amendment as the iconic symbol of the social
contradictions that riddle American culture.130 The richness, for
Carey, lies precisely in the dramatically different ways in which
groups of people pattern their existences. Needs and motives
encountered in various cultural groups are not “anything more than
one cultural version among many and not some final court against
which to judge the veridicalness of other modes of experience.”131 On
that register, the Council’s dictatorial behavior toward GLIB, in
contradistinction to its typically nonexistent selection procedure,132
looks akin to “low value” speech, if anything. This would be a
radically different view of the role of speakers and speech than that
now entertained by the Court.
Carey’s theory would arguably preference GLIB for a second
reason: to the extent that the Council’s conception of itself as “the”
speaker is grounded in a transmission model – that is, it sought to
control the transmission of traditional religious and social values and
people’s ability to express sexual themes133 – Carey’s theory might
reject the Council’s post hoc rationalization as less important than the
individual marchers’ ability to engage in expression. Communication
is the name Carey extends to experiencing, disseminating, and
celebrating phenomena, not the name for the practice “of controlling
space and people.”134
Third, under Carey’s view, meaning is socially constructed and
constitutive of reality. This premise has a couple of implications, each
of which favors GLIB. First, in order to make an educated guess
about the likelihood of misattribution, the Court would have to
consider the socio-political context in which the audiences viewed the
parade, and would have to engage in a cultural analysis to determine
whether GLIB’s participation in the annual parade would arguably
hold symbolic significance for the relevant community. This would
130. See Carey, supra n. 109, at 6.
131. Id. at 67.
132. The lower courts found that the “Council had no written criteria and employed
no particular procedures for admission, voted on new applications in batches, had
occasionally admitted groups who simply showed up at the parade without having
submitted an application, and did ‘not generally inquire into the specific messages or views
of each applicant.” 515 U.S. at 562.
133. Id. at 562.
134. Carey, supra n. 109, at 17.
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necessarily entail a study of popular reactions to, or anxieties
expressed after, GLIB’s participation in the parade the previous year.
The Court might need to consider cultural artifacts – such as
newspaper stories, transcripts from town hall debates, or other
cultural clues – and perform a rhetorical, cultural analysis to decipher
whether GLIB’s participation really had the anticipated effects that
the Council claimed it would (i.e., misattribution and dampening of
the Council’s proffered traditional values). Given the current antihomosexual majoritarian political sentiment in the U.S., it is at least
likely that GLIB’s message would be viewed as illegitimate in the
eyes of most bystanders. Then again, given the variety of audience
reactions to any single message – particularly cultural dramas
unaccompanied by explicit, preexisting statements of intent or
purpose – such an analysis strikes one as an unlikely project that the
Council can reliably prove. It is extraordinarily difficult to predict
audience reaction in advance.
In short, Carey’s culture-oriented theory provides no basis for
the Council to claim that GLIB’s participation will necessarily be
attributed to the Council (as an endorsement): the Court (or, more
likely, the Council) would have to articulate that argument by
predicting how audiences might react to the symbolic spectacle; the
de-selection itself would need to be characterized as a kind of
political speech or association – a manifestation of the Council’s
answer to existing problems in the wider community. But, what
neither the government nor the Council can regulate under a cultural
theory of communication, such as Carey’s, is audience response.
Since the Council would not be able to prove misattribution, one of
the pillars upon which it relies to claim speaker status would arguably
be eroded.
Even if the Council proved some margin of misattribution, that
would not be a reason to conclude that GLIB’s message overpowered
the other, more traditional parade units, or a justification for holding
that the Council, acting as a speaker, deserved preeminent speaker
status. Carey’s radically “public” theory of communication suggests
that communication is always public because it relies on a publicly
shared stock of symbols. Private thought is a derived and secondary
capability. This distinction inserts something of a gap between public
performances, like parades, and the private thoughts that follow (e.g.,
a bystander’s impressions of GLIB’s participation), and it suggests
that the relationships between the two are decidedly not governed by
the Council’s intentions, but rather by the ritual order(s) prevalent in
the observers’ minds. If Carey is right, then the state courts were
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astutely correct when they declared the Council’s speech itself to be a
“public” site, subject to the Massachusetts public accommodation law
prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals.135 Of course, this is a
radical departure from the traditional view of speakers under First
Amendment jurisprudence, and it unravels many of our fundamental
assumptions about the feasibility of owning speech.136
3.

The Court’s Reasoning

In Hurley, the Court implicitly recognized the ritualistic power of
parading. It recounted in detail the historic nature and significance of
the Saint Patrick’s Day parade in Boston. It characterized parades as
public dramas of inherent symbolic and communicative worth. As an
initial premise, then, the Court agreed with Carey’s notion that
ritualistic human practices become imbued, over time, with great
cultural significance that reveals social actors’ relationship to the
broader American culture.
Ultimately, however, the Court dismissed the possibility that the
Council’s decision to exclude GLIB could be reversed by the state.137
The basis for the Court’s decision was that the Council enjoyed no
monopoly of access to spectators, as a cable operator does, and that
GLIB can hold its own parade. Given the fact that no speakers would
“be destroyed in the absence of” the Massachussets public
accommodation statue, the Court would not endorse an attempt to
compel speech upon the Council.138
135. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73. After noting that the statute was well within the
state’s power, the Court reasoned:
In the case before us, however, the Massachusetts law has been applied in a
peculiar way. Its enforcement does not address any dispute about the
participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various units
admitted to the parade. Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals
as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from
parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march.
Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit
carrying its own banner. Since every participating unit affects the message
conveyed by the private organizers, the state court’s application of the statute
produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content
of their parade. Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of
public accommodation, once the expressive character of both the parade and the
marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that the state
courts’ application of the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech
itself to be the public accommodation.
136. A trademark, for example, could represent a situation where one “owns” speech.
137. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566.
138. Id. at 578 (stating that GLIB’s arguments amount to “what the general rule of
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Moreover, the Court ultimately held that the Council’s parade
could not be declared “public.” Doing so would have shocking
results, according to the Court:
Under this approach, any contingent of protected individuals with a
message would have the right to participate in petitioners’ speech,
so that the communication produced by the private organizers
would be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to
join in with some expressive demonstration of their own. But this
use of the State’s power violates the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
139
choose the content of [its] own message.

Thus the Court departs from Carey’s theory, and instead justifies
its decision by naming the Council the preeminent speaker. But its
previous resonance with Carey’s cultural approach seems to undercut
the notion that the Council earned preeminent speaker status.

III. Speaking Out of Thin Air
The First Amendment was born in the 1960s within a political
imagery that presumed the existence of an individual human speaker,
standing on a street corner soap box (i.e., in a public forum), speaking
his or her mind to those who choose to listen.140 The First
Amendment has long been tethered to protecting that traditional
conception of speech.
Today, perhaps five percent of the speech that courts adjudicate
involves such traditional speech situations. Problems of technology,
new media, corporate entities, the comparatively recent right not to
speak, anonymous speech, and government speech complicate the
picture radically. Speech selection judgments present one of the
recent outgrowths of these shifts in communicative phenomena, and
they present unique problems of multiple, competing speakers and
multiple, competing artifacts of speech. The current Court has little,
if any, precedent to call upon for adjudicating these new problems,
for making order out of competing speech claims. The Court’s
underlying theories of communication or speech are too potentially
varied, not well understood, and never carried out fully.
Hurley is a case in point. The Court’s theory of communication
speaker’s autonomy forbids”).
139. Id. at 573.
140. Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986). See
supra n. 111 (noting Carey’s argument that the practice of communication was historically
situated within the ancient theory of the voice).
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is ambiguous. The decision in Hurley does not fit nicely into any
single view of communication. Indeed, the Court at various points
seems to rely on all the versions of communication we have discussed.
It agrees with Austin that certain kinds of speech, including parades
and marching, have undeniable communicative force and are
therefore inherently expressive speech acts.141 The Court also seems
to argue, as Hirsch would, that intent or purpose is relevant to
discerning GLIB’s message (although the Court ignores intent for the
purposes of granting First Amendment speaker status to the
Council).142 The opinion relies heavily on audience and audience
construction of a message, as Peters’ dissemination model would, to
determine the value of the disseminated expression at issue.143
Finally, the opinion also resonates with Carey’s idea that
communication is cultural and ritualistic.144 But all four theories
cannot coexist – at least not coherently.
More importantly, some versions of the Court’s communication
theories are radically at odds with the traditional assumptions of the
First Amendment: that speaking is an intentional act; that messages
are a function of a speaker, message, and intent; and that speech is a
liberty of the speaker, not the audience. Hurley’s result resonates
only momentarily with the assumptions about intention and stable
meaning that underlie Hirsch’s conceptions; the same can be said for
the notion of illocutionary force articulated by Austin. In fact, Hurley
is perhaps most easily squared with Peters’ view of communication as

141. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 (stating that “parades are thus a form of expression,
not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our
cases involving protest marchers”).
142. Id. at 570 (stating that GLIB’s participation in the parade was “expressive”) and
569-70 (rejecting the state courts’ conclusion that the Council evinced no specific
expressive purpose and arguing, instead, that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is
not a condition of constitutional protection”; neither must a speaker “generate, as an
original matter, each item featured in the communication”).
143. Id. at 568 (stating that “a parade’s dependence on watchers is so extreme that
nowadays . . . ‘if a parade or demonstration receives no media coverage, it may as well not
have happened”), and at 575 (arguing that the Council is more than a mere conduit – a
mere technology of dissemination – “because GLIB’s participation would likely be
perceived as having resulted from the Council’s customary determination about a unit
admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of
support as well”); see also id. at 576 (arguing that “when dissemination of a view contrary
to one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected [by way of audience
perception] with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the
message is compromised”).
144. Id. at 569 (“Real ‘parades are public dramas of social relations, and in them
performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for
communication and consideration.”).
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dissemination and with Carey’s view of communication as culture.
The Court’s language is clearly most sympathetic with Carey’s
cultural and constructed conception of communication.
While Hurley in this sense may be an attractive communication
theory to some, it may serve poorly as a basis for law. Carey or
Peters may be quite right about how communicative phenomena
work, and quite content with the idea that meaning is a social
phenomenon. But their models may be deeply flawed as a basis for
For instance, the Hurley Court
First Amendment speech.
unanimously insisted that the Council could not possibly function as a
mere conduit, which would make its acts mere conduct. Rather, the
parade was an inherently expressive social drama with ritualistic,
symbolic meaning. But the Court’s conclusion rested on an audiencebased argument.145 This is a non-sequitur. More importantly, the
Court’s reasoning subordinated the speech interests of the people
arguably speaking and performing (the paraders) to those of the
Council. Its reasoning, like Carey’s, thus threatens to cast off, for
First Amendment purposes, much of the protection the law has
traditionally granted to individual speakers. The Court effectively
loses meaning “out of thin air,” tethering messages to arbitrary claims
about audience perception rather than to the conventional elements
of text and speaker intention.
The implications of viewing free speech as disseminated cultural
metaphors and images are vast. Such a view would privilege as free
speech the inadvertent as well as – indeed perhaps more than – the
advertent. It would formally disconnect speakers from speech. It
would also countenance an active role by government in judging and
managing speech in light of its social and democratic value and
benefits. Carey’s theory of communication as culture would convert a
broad range of acts now deemed conduct into speech, and vice versa.
We leave the full critique of the Court’s approach to speech
selection judgments to another time and article, but the prevalence
and complexities of speech selection judgments can no longer be
ignored. The complicated and new forms of speech growing out of
modern conditions cannot be allowed to impart a collective amnesia
about the hallmark speech situation that first animated the right of
free speech. Though the realities of contemporary speech selection
judgments complicate the idyllic picture of a single orator delivering a
political speech, the rights of the intentional, speaking individual can

145. See infra nn. 44-47 (discussing the Court’s reliance on the construct of audience
perception).
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and should be afforded the greatest degree of privilege under the
First Amendment.

